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In September 1997, at the outset of the last global financial 
crisis, the Japanese Ministry of Finance proposed the creation of 
an Asian Monetary Fund. Although this particular proposal was 
scuttled, the idea of a common regional fund on which East Asian 
governments might draw in times of financial turmoil survives. 
The region’s disaffection from the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), stemming from the 1997–98 crisis, sustains this idea and 
a desire on the part of individual countries to self-insure with 
large holdings of foreign exchange reserves. East Asian govern-
ments and central banks have created a set of bilateral swap 
arrangements (BSAs) dubbed the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) 
and are negotiating among themselves to build these BSAs into 
a more comprehensive facility. Some Asian officials hope that 
such a facility could underpin exchange rate cooperation and 
monetary  integration  in  the  region,  although  such  proposals 
remain for the moment long-term visions. 
The present financial crisis raises the prospect that some 
governments might draw on their BSAs under the CMI and 
increases the stakes in the CMI’s possible future development 
into a comprehensive facility. This juncture thus represents a 
moment of truth for East Asia: Are these governments serious 
about financial cooperation? Can they overcome rivalries and 
make the difficult political decisions to advance it? Will they 
adhere to or break from international financial institutions such 
as the IMF?
Senior officials of East Asian governments and central banks 
will meet three times between February and May 2009 to consid-
er, among other things, transforming the CMI from a network of 
BSAs into a collectively managed fund. These meetings take place 
under the aegis of ASEAN+3, the ten members of the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations1 plus China, Japan, and South Korea. 
Their 13 finance ministers will meet on February 22 prior to a 
meeting of the ASEAN heads of government beginning Febru-
ary 27 in Thailand. The finance ministers will then meet again 
in Bali, Indonesia, in early May. The three meetings straddle the 
next summit of the Group of Twenty (G-20) in London in early 
April. An ASEAN+3 agreement to create a common regional fund 
would realize some, though not all, of the features of the original 
Asian Monetary Fund proposal and significantly alter the global 
financial architecture. Whether the 13 governments are willing to 
cross that threshold, however, remains to be seen.
This policy brief (1) provides a brief primer on the CMI, 
(2) reviews the issues under discussion for its conversion into 
a common regional fund, and (3) offers recommendations to 
governments in East Asia and the rest of the world to enhance 
complementarity between financial regionalism and global insti-
tutions such as the IMF. 
1. The 10 ASEAN members are Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Burma/Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.N u m b e r   Pb0 9 - 5    f e b r u a r y  2 0 0 9
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Reviewing the CMI and possibilities for its regionaliza-
tion is all the more timely in light of a notable increase in the 
number and relevance of other regional and bilateral financial 
arrangements. At the outset of their recent crises, for example, 
Iceland and Pakistan each appealed to reserve-rich countries in 
an unsuccessful effort to avoid resorting to the IMF. The Euro-
pean Union provided large shares of the financial packages for 
Hungary and Latvia. Russia has announced modest support 
for  regional  neighbors,  and  Ukrainian  officials  have  asked 
Moscow to consider a large loan. In addition, since December 
2007, the US Federal Reserve has opened swap agreements 
with 14 central banks including several in East Asia.2 While 
these  arrangements  have  so  far  avoided  colliding  with  one 
another  and  with  the  IMF,  the  potential  for  conflict  rises 
with the number and diversity of alternative financial facili-
ties. The international community must address the respective 
roles of bilateral and regional facilities and global financial 
institutions, notably the IMF, and coordination among them 
(Henning 2002, 2008). 
The Chiang Mai iniTiaTive 
The  CMI  was  launched  at  a  meeting  of  ASEAN+3  finance 
ministers in Thailand in May 2000. They announced a broad 
set  of  objectives  for  financial  cooperation,  involving  policy 
dialogue, monitoring of capital flows, and reform of interna-
tional financial institutions. The finance ministers would also 
later add bond-market initiatives and regional bond funds to 
their agenda for regional cooperation. But at Chiang Mai their 
core  objective  was  to  establish  a  network  of  BSAs  between 
Northeast and Southeast Asian members. As these BSAs were 
negotiated  and  concluded  over  the  subsequent  years,  their 
number grew to 16—although the number in effect at any one 
time varies, as these arrangements lapse and are renegotiated 
and reinstated.3 ASEAN+3 finance ministers reviewed the CMI 
in 2004–05 and launched a “stage two,” roughly doubling the 
nominal size of the swaps among other things. Asian officials 
now place the total amount that can be mobilized under these 
BSAs at $83 billion. Eliminating double-counting and remov-
ing arrangements that have mostly symbolic value, however, 
reduces the total to $50 billion to $60 billion. These arrange-
ments  nonetheless  potentially  mobilize  funds  that  represent 
a  multiple  of  the  IMF  quotas  for  Indonesia,  Malaysia,  the 
2. The Fed also maintains long-standing swap agreements with the Bank of 
Canada and Bank of Mexico.  
3. The CMI rubric and BSAs are described in detail in Henning (2002). See 
Kawai and Houser (2007) for a useful update. 
Philippines, Thailand, and South Korea.4 Because they can be 
renewed up to seven times, these (three-month) “swaps” can 
provide not only short-term liquidity but also medium-term 
balance-of-payments financing.
The amounts that individual countries can access under 
these arrangements depend on the specific BSAs in place with 
Japan, China, and South Korea. In principle, Indonesia can 
borrow $12 billion, Thailand and the Philippines $9 billion 
each,  and  Malaysia  $6.5  billion  under  their  arrangements 
with the three creditors. Prior to recent agreements (discussed 
below) South Korea could borrow from both its Northeast 
Asian partners, Japan and China, as well as from Southeast 
Asian countries, with whom it has two-way arrangements, for 
a grand total of $23 billion.5 
These amounts must be qualified by three observations, 
however, two of which suggest more limited access and one 
that suggests greater access.  First, the 16 BSAs have specified 
terms and, therefore, will be in various states of expiration, 
renegotiation, and renewal at any one time. Second, under 
the BSAs, activation is not automatic on the request of the 
borrower. Activation also requires approval by the creditor, 
which, while perhaps expected, is not guaranteed and hinges 
critically on decisions of the IMF (discussed below). Third, 
the amounts, while modest, can nonetheless be raised rela-
tively quickly in a crisis. While raising amounts available is not 
trivial, this particular matter can sometimes be renegotiated 
more easily once an agreement is in place than negotiating an 
entirely new agreement. 
Recently, East Asian central banks have announced  several 
new swap agreements outside the ambit of the CMI.   In Decem-
ber 2008 the three countries in Northeast Asia announced (a) 
an increase in the size of one of the Japan-Korea swaps from 
the equivalent of $3 billion to the equivalent of $20 billion and 
(b) the establishment of a new China-Korea swap equivalent to 
roughly $26 billion. In concluding these agreements, Japanese 
and Chinese officials appeared to be responding to the exten-
sion of a $30 billion swap agreement to Korea by the US Federal 
Reserve.6 China subsequently also extended two local-currency 
4. The development of the CMI and associated policy issues are debated in 
Henning (2002, 2006), Eichengreen (2002), Bergsten and Park (2002), de 
Brouwer (2004), Kuroda and Kawai (2004), Rajan and Sirigar (2004), Amyx 
(2005, 2008), Grimes (2006, 2009), among others.
5. See, for example, Kawai and Houser (2007) and the frequently cited 
diagram at the website of the Japanese Ministry of Finance, www.mof.go.jp/
english/if/cmi_0707.pdf. 
6. Bank of Japan, “The Bank of Japan and the Bank of Korea Announce an 
Increase in the Size of the Yen-Won Swap Arrangement” December 12, 2008, 
available at www.boj.or.jp; People’s Bank of China, “The People’s Bank of 
China and the Bank of Korea have agreed to establish a Swap Arrangement,” 
December 12, 2008, available at www.pbc.gov.cn; US Federal Reserve, “Fed-
eral Reserve, Banco Central do Brasil, Banco de Mexico, Bank of Korea, and N u m b e r   Pb0 9 - 5                                                                                                       f e b r u a r y  2 0 0 9
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swap arrangements, one to Hong Kong equivalent to about   
$34  billion  and  the  other  to  Malaysia  equivalent  to  about   
$13.5 billion.7 
While the new swaps increase the financing that recipients can 
make available to private banks facing short-term funding prob-
lems, they are not intended to be used for balance-of-payments 
financing. The intra-regional agreements are sometimes referred 
to as “sunshine swaps” for this reason.  The local-currency nature 
of these swaps further limits their value to situations in which 
yen or renminbi liquidity is needed.   Korea’s immediate concern 
in fall 2008, however, was to fund the dollar liabilities of Korean 
banks, though they might also have funding needs in Japanese 
yen. We should consider the new liquidity swaps and the CMI 
swaps to be separate facilities for these reasons. While these new 
swaps have large face value, help to underpin confidence, and 
are a potentially useful adjunct to the CMI, they should not be 
considered a substantial expansion of the CMI per se.
Five aspects of the evolution of the CMI and parallel 
trends and developments are useful for placing the present 
negotiations over a common fund in context. 
First, the CMI was not by any means the only response 
of  East  Asian  governments  to  the  Asian  financial  crisis  of 
1997–98.  They  generally  pursued  multipronged  strategies 
that  included  self-insurance  via  the  accumulation  of  large 
reserves of US dollars and other foreign exchange. Undervalu-
ation of their currencies and trade surpluses also conferred a 
sense of financial security on East Asian policymakers. One 
consequence  was  that  East  Asian  governments  collectively 
commanded the wherewithal to fight financial crises—if they 
were willing to commit some of their large reserve holdings to 
one another for this purpose.
Second, the CMI was not independent from the IMF. 
The 13 countries within the group debated the extent of the 
linkage  at  some  length.  All  were  cognizant  of  the  region’s 
experience under IMF programs during the 1997–98 crisis 
and none wanted to repeat that experience. But the poten-
tial creditors within the group also perceived a need to attach 
conditions that the region was not yet capable of defining. 
A compromise was reached at the outset whereby 90 percent 
of the amounts available under the BSAs would be disbursed 
only if the borrower also agreed to an IMF program but that 
10 percent could be disbursed prior to such a program, and the 
split would be reviewed. In 2005 the finance ministers agreed 
Monetary Authority of Singapore announce the establishment of temporary 
reciprocal currency arrangements,” October 29, 2008, available at www.
federalreserve.gov.
7. People’s Bank of China, “PBC and HKMA Signed Currency Swap Agree-
ment,” January 20, 2009, available at www.pbc.gov.cn; “The People’s Bank of 
China and Bank Negara Malaysia established a Currency Swap Arrangement,” 
February 8, 2009, available at www.pbc.gov.cn. 
to raise the amount disbursable without a Fund program to 
20 percent.8 Conceived as such, the CMI is largely a “second” 
or “parallel line of defense” to IMF financing. Note, however, 
that the “IMF link” does not apply to the short-term liquidity 
swaps intended to help fund liabilities of financial institu-
tions—such as the local-currency swaps among Japan, China, 
and South Korea—as opposed to medium-term balance-of-
payments loans.
Third,  ASEAN+3  also  launched  a  regional  surveillance 
mechanism called the Economic Review and Policy Dialogue. 
Many officials within the region hoped for the mechanism to 
evolve to the point of providing information and analysis that 
would  permit  the  identification  of  financial  and  economic 
vulnerabilities among members and provide a foundation for 
regionally defined conditionality in the event that the BSAs 
were called upon. Japanese officials, among others, explicitly 
conditioned any reduction in the proportion of the BSAs linked 
to IMF programs to the strengthening of regional surveillance. 
But  shaping  policy  conditionality  is  demanding,  requiring 
excellent information and sophisticated analysis, and enforc-
ing it requires political determination. By contrast, ASEAN+3 
surveillance has strengthened only gradually and is not yet up 
to the task of setting appropriate conditions for medium-term 
balance-of-payments lending by the region.9 For this reason, 
any disbursements under the BSAs would still be largely condi-
tioned on a Stand-By Arrangement with the IMF. 
Fourth, East Asian governments evolved their arrangements 
with an eye to reforms within the IMF. In particular, they 
hoped to see changes to Fund facilities, policy conditionality, 
and governance, especially with respect to granting them larger 
quotas and thus voting rights in the Executive Board and Board 
of Governors. After a long negotiation, however, the results 
agreed to at the April 2008 meetings in Washington, still to be 
ratified, were modest in terms of increasing the quotas of the 
8. The Joint Ministerial Statement of the 8th ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers’ 
Meeting, Istanbul, Turkey, May 4, 2005, available at www.aseansec.org. 
9. Contributions on ASEAN+3 surveillance include Kawai and Houser 
(2007), Institute for International Monetary Affairs (2005) and Wang and 
Yoon (2002).
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The  ASEAN+3  finance  ministers  announced  more 
substantial agreement on the matter at their 2007 meeting in 
Kyoto, Japan:
We noted the substantial progress made in the activi-
ties of the new Taskforce on CMI Multilateralisation. 
Proceeding with a step-by-step approach, we unanimous-
ly agreed in principle that a self-managed reserve pooling 
arrangement governed by a single contractual agreement 
is an appropriate form of multilateralisation. We recog-
nised the consensus reached as a significant achievement 
towards an advanced framework of regional liquidity 
support mechanism. We instructed the Deputies to carry 
out further in-depth studies on the key elements of the 
multilateralisation of the CMI including surveillance, 
reserve eligibility, size of commitment, borrowing quota 
and activation mechanism. Meanwhile, we reiterated our 
commitment to maintain the two core objectives of the 
CMI, i.e., (i) to address short-term liquidity difficulties 
in the region and (ii) to supplement the existing inter-
national financial arrangements.12
The  phrase  “self-managed”  qualifies  “reserve”  in  the 
second sentence, meaning that the reserves would not in fact 
be physically collected in a common fund but would instead 
be  held  by  national  central  banks  and  earmarked  for  that 
purpose. As the sentence also states, however, the disposition 
of those reserves would be common and subject to a single 
agreement,  rather  than  a  series  of  agreements  such  as  the 
BSAs. The final sentence repeats a phrase that appears in all 
of the previous communiqués, a coded reference to the linked 
and unlinked portions of the swaps. Significantly, the same is 
to apply to any new common fund, although the 20-80 split 
might be revised.
Meeting in Madrid in May 2008, the finance ministers 
announced progress toward agreeing on “rigorous principles” 
governing  a  common  fund  and  “key  concepts”  related  to 
borrowing arrangements (discussed in the following section). 
They also declared that “it is indispensable to build a credible 
system  in  ASEAN+3  to  monitor  the  economic  and  finan-
cial situation of member countries” and cited some specific 
measures toward that end.13 
www.aseansec.org.
12. The Joint Ministerial Statement of the 10th ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers’ 
Meeting, Kyoto, Japan, May 5, 2007, paragraph 6, available at 
www.aseansec.org. 
13. Joint Ministerial Statement of the 11th ASEAN Plus Three ASEAN 
Ministers Meeting, Madrid, Spain, May 4, 2008, paragraph 7, available at 
www.aseansec.org.
Fund and redistributing quotas and voting shares (see, among 
other treatments, Truman 2008). On the other hand, the Fund 
has extended new facilities and has reviewed conditionality. At 
this point, however, it does not seem likely that these changes 
will allay Asian misgivings about the IMF. 
Finally, it is important to note that none of the BSAs have 
been activated as of this writing. Most of the period since the 
establishment of the CMI has been relatively benign. To our 
knowledge,  none  of  the  Southeast  Asian  countries  have  yet 
formally  requested  activation.  ASEAN+3,  therefore,  enters 
the present crisis and embarks on intensive negotiations over 
“multilateralisation”  with  critical  elements  of  these  arrange-
ments—decision  making,  coordination  among  the  creditors, 
defining the terms, and coordination with the IMF—untested.
“MulTilaTeralisaTion” of The CMi
The members of ASEAN+3 refer to the creation of a common 
fund  as  a  “multilateralisation”  of  the  CMI,  by  which  they 
mean collectivization on a regional basis. In this sense the 
term “multilateral” refers to something more that “bilateral” 
and less than “global.” I prefer to reserve the term “multilat-
eral” to refer to the global level and to describe the IMF and 
World Bank as “multilateral institutions” but defer to Asian 
usage for the purposes of this policy brief. It is important to 
emphasize that, as this policy brief goes to press, there is no 
clear agreement on the part of the 13 governments to proceed 
with multilateralisation, but they are instead engaged in nego-
tiations that could result in such an agreement. 
The  objective  of  multilateralising  the  CMI  was  first 
mentioned in the communiqués of the ASEAN+3 finance minis-
ters at their Istanbul meeting in May 2005. After announcing 
the objectives of the second stage of the CMI—enhancement 
of surveillance, clarification of the activation process, adop-
tion of common decision making, doubling the size of the 
swaps, and reducing the IMF link to 80 percent—the minis-
ters declared, “To further enhance the CMI’s effectiveness, 
we tasked the Deputies to study the various possible routes 
towards multilateralizing the CMI.”10 At Hyderabad, India, in 
May 2006, the finance ministers “tasked the Deputies to set 
up a ‘new task force’ to further study various possible options 
towards  an  advanced  framework  of  the  regional  liquidity 
support arrangement (CMI multilateralization or Post-CMI), 
based upon their exploration during the past year.”11 
10. The Joint Ministerial Statement of the 8th ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers’ 
Meeting, Istanbul, Turkey, May 4, 2005, paragraph 7, available at www.
aseansec.org.
11. The Joint Ministerial Statement of the 9th ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers’ 




Creating a common regional fund would require addressing 
questions of obligations, contributions, and rights of members 
as well as the size, governance, and borrowing arrangements—
the same set of issues confronted by the architects of the Bret-
ton Woods  institutions.  This  section  enumerates  these  key 
questions—providing a checklist for outsiders observing the 
evolution of these arrangements—and offers some prelimi-
nary answers. 
What Exactly Would Be the Nature of 
Multilateralisation?
ASEAN+3 member states had considered pooling reserves into 
a single account that could be held, managed, and disbursed 
by a secretariat, as is the case with the IMF. Present discussions, 
however, center on whether to earmark reserves for a common 
fund and instead retain them in the accounts of national central 
banks and finance ministries. Officials engaged in these talks 
thus refer to the present proposal as a “self-managed reserve 
pooling arrangement” or an SRPA. Recently this term has 
been replaced in some statements by Chiang Mai Initiative 
Multilateralisation, or CMIM, but SRPA is more descriptive. 
Nonetheless, if the ASEAN+3 members were to take this step, 
these funds, while held separately, would be administered in 
common under a joint decision making process—a common 
fund in effect. 
How Large Would the Fund Be?
Given that East Asian governments collectively hold the equiv-
alent of roughly $3.5 trillion in foreign exchange reserves, the 
region could clearly create a robust fund with just a small 
portion  of  its  reserves.  ASEAN+3  finance  ministers  previ-
ously declared that, if they agree to multilateralisation, their 
common fund would amount to $80 billion.14 But in the face 
of the present crisis, several Asian officials have proposed that 
much larger amounts of reserves be dedicated to the fund.15 
Meeting among themselves, the 10 ASEAN finance ministers 
appear to have agreed to propose that the previously agreed 
14. Joint Ministerial Statement of the 11th ASEAN Plus Three ASEAN 
Ministers Meeting, Madrid, Spain, May 4, 2008, paragraph 8, available at 
www.aseansec.org.
15. Joyce Pangco Panares, “$80-B Fund Approved By Asean, 3 Partners,” 
Manila Standard, October 25, 2008; “Thailand to propose $350-bn Asian 
pool,” Nation, October 23, 2008. 
number be raised by half, to $120 billion.16 Although expecta-
tions are converging on that figure, the exact size remains a 
point of negotiation. 
Which Countries Would Be Members?
As implied in the earlier discussion, the membership would 
be the 13 countries of ASEAN+3. But this question raises a 
couple of important points about the arrangement. First, such 
a fund would considerably broaden participation in regional 
financial facilities beyond the eight countries that presently 
have BSAs in place; it would include Laos, Cambodia, Viet-
nam, Burma/Myanmar, and Brunei in the process for the first 
time. Second, it is worth emphasizing that it would include 
Burma/Myanmar in particular, a country that has been deeply 
problematic but for which ASEAN officials hope participation 
in regional affairs could be rehabilitative.
What Would Be Members’ Contributions?
ASEAN+3 would have to agree on the exact contribution of 
each member, and therefore their relative shares, before an 
accord  is  concluded.  The  Madrid  communiqué  announced 
that the three Northeast Asian members would contribute 80 
percent while the 10 Southeast Asian members would contrib-
ute 20 percent of the common fund.17 However, ASEAN+3 has 
yet to decide on the allocation of contributions within these 
two groups. The shares of China and Japan are particularly 
important, because they will determine the relative influence 
of the two countries. The issue of which country would have 
the larger share, or whether the two would have equal shares, 
is probably the most important and difficult question facing 
ASEAN+3 negotiators. 
How Would the Fund Be Governed?
This question can in turn be broken down into three subsid-
iary questions: In what institution, forum, or group will deci-
sions be taken? Under what decision rule? With what weights 
to each member? Any common fund would require a collec-
tive body to make decisions on, for example, activation—the 
16. Dario Agnote, “ASEAN plans to beef up pooled reserves to fight crisis,” 
Kyodo News, December 16, 2008; “ASEAN, regional partners likely to 
increase crisis funds—Indonesian minister,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 
December 15, 2008. 
17. Joint Ministerial Statement of the 11th ASEAN Plus Three ASEAN 
Ministers Meeting Madrid, Spain, May 4, 2008, paragraph 8, available at 
www.aseansec.org.N u m b e r   Pb0 9 - 5    f e b r u a r y  2 0 0 9
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functional equivalent of the Executive Boards of the IMF and 
World Bank. ASEAN+3 would have to agree not only on the 
balance between China and Japan but also on the balance 
between the potential creditors and debtors under the arrange-
ment. There appears to be broad support among members for 
the principle of weighted voting, where each country wields 
votes in rough proportion to its contribution to the fund, and 
for taking decisions by a supermajority rather than by simple 
majority or unanimity. But the establishment of voting rather 
than  unanimity  and  the  weights,  size  of  the  majority,  and 
scope of matters that would be subjected to voting remain to 
be decided. Agreement on a common fund could also founder 
on these sensitive institutional and political questions. 
Will the Bilateral Swap Arrangements Be Retired?
Much of the public speculation about the future of the CMI 
assumes that its regionalization would substitute the common 
fund for the BSAs. This is not necessarily the case. Each pair 
of countries is likely to decide the fate of their bilateral swaps. 
Thus, while some might choose to retire, others might choose to 
renew or enlarge their BSAs even once a common fund becomes 
operational. Both potential lenders and borrowers have incen-
tives to maintain multiple lines of finance: If ASEAN+3 cannot 
agree to use the fund collectively, country pairs might retain 
the option to activate bilateral swaps in a crisis. At this point, 
countries in the region might well place a higher value on flex-
ibility than on solidarity. Coexistence of a common fund and 
BSAs could facilitate agreement on joint decision making by 
reducing the risk that adopting a supermajority or unanimity 
decision rule would block disbursements in a crisis. 
On What Terms Would a Common Fund Lend to Its 
Members?
If a common fund were created, ASEAN+3 would have to set 
the terms on which it could be activated. Such terms fall into 
two basic categories: loan terms and policy conditionality. The 
former refers mainly to the amount, maturity, interest rate, and 
collateral arrangements for the loan. Under the rubric of the 
CMI, the terms of the BSAs have been reasonably well defined. 
Beyond  the  first  20  percent  of  the  swap,  borrowers  could 
originally activate on a 90-day basis, renewable seven times, at 
increasing increments over Libor (Henning 2002, 20–21; see 
also Grimes 2009, 82). However, these terms are evolving and 
could well change under any common fund.
The  second  category  refers  to  the  policy  adjustments, 
if any, that would be required of borrowers in exchange for 
activating the fund—including changes in fiscal and monetary 
policies. Because the policy conditionality of the IMF proved 
to be the most contentious and resented aspect of the 1997–98 
financial crisis, such conditions would be politically charged. 
Yet, the governments of the region must also be concerned 
about (a) moral hazard, (b) default, and (c) contagion within 
the region and for these reasons must consider whether policy 
conditions are required and, if so, what those should be in any 
given case. Those decisions can in principle be (a) outsourced 
by making disbursements from a common fund contingent 
on agreeing to an IMF program or (b) developed within the 
region by the managers and governing board of the fund. 
Would the Common Fund Be Linked to the IMF?
The disbursements of any common fund created by ASEAN+3 
would  be  linked  to  IMF  program  lending  as  would  any 
disbursements under the BSAs. As discussed above, under the 
present BSAs, borrowers can draw up to 20 percent of their 
swaps prior to agreeing on an IMF program, including required 
policy adjustments, but would need such a program to access 
the  remainder.  Several  of  the  potential  borrowers  would  no 
doubt like to see this linkage reduced; the 13-member group is 
committed to reviewing the link periodically, and it could well 
be adjusted in the future. But the potential creditors, includ-
ing especially Japan, have conditioned a softening of the link 
on improvements in regional surveillance and the institutional 
capacity to analyze members’ needs and identify needed policy 
adjustments  on  a  regional  basis.  Given  the  present  state  of 
surveillance within the region, as discussed above, the IMF link 
should be retained.
sTanCe of non-asians
The opposition of the US Treasury and the refusal of China to 
support the proposal famously scuttled the 1997 plan for the 
Asian Monetary Fund (Blustein 2001, 162–70). Several of the 
people then at Treasury are now senior officials in the Barack 
Obama administration, in particular Treasury Secretary Timo-
thy F. Geithner and Director of the National Economic Council 
Lawrence H. Summers. Since 1997, however, several important 
changes have cast East Asian financial regionalism in a differ-
ent  light.  The  number  of  regional  economic  arrangements, 
both financial and trade, have continued to increase around the 
globe, with the United States itself instigating several of them. 
The CMI has evolved along conventional lines since its creation 
in 2000. East Asian countries have accumulated massive foreign 
exchange reserves, giving them the wherewithal to contribute to 
emergency financial packages. Meanwhile, the underrepresenta-
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within the IMF, which has gone for about a decade without a 
general increase in quotas despite dramatic growth in the world 
economy and in financial vulnerability of many members. 
The  United  States,  Europe,  and  the  rest  of  the  world 
have an interest in ASEAN+3 advancing East Asian financial 
cooperation in ways that are consistent with their obligations 
in the IMF and coordinated with that institution. The lack of 
development of surveillance within ASEAN+3 means the IMF 
link would be maintained for the time being. It is worth noting 
that the European Union, whose surveillance and analytical 
capacities are well developed, has cooperated closely with the 
IMF  in  recent  programs  for  Central  and  Eastern  European 
countries. Provided that ASEAN+3 manages the bilateralised 
or multilateralised CMI in this way—a proviso that applies to 
other regional financial facilities as well—the rest of the world 
can accept these arrangements. 
The  Bill  Clinton  administration  in  its  last  years  and 
the George W. Bush administration accepted the CMI. But 
it has been quite some time since US policymakers made a 
clear  statement  about  their  views  on  East  Asian  financial 
regionalism. They have nonetheless made several constructive 
contributions to economic and financial stability within the 
region. First, the US Federal Reserve has put in place large 
facilities with 14 central banks to help provide dollar liquidity 
to foreign financial institutions when private markets seize up. 
These facilities, recently extended to October 2009, include 
arrangements with Japan, Singapore, and South Korea and 
were important in treating Korea’s problems in the fall of 2008. 
Second, the United States cooperated with other members and 
the staff to introduce the Short-Term Liquidity Facility (SLF) 
and Exogenous Shocks Facility at the IMF. 
ProsPeCTs for agreeMenT
Differences between Japan and China and between potential 
creditors and debtors could still block agreement. However, 
the  systemic  environment  affects  the  calculus  of  these  key 
actors regarding regional cooperation. As I argued during the 
first phase of the CMI (Henning 2002, 29–31), the source 
and severity of financial shocks and the response of the inter-
national community were likely to determine the path of East 
Asian financial cooperation. If shocks came from within the 
region,  or  were  insignificant,  and  the  IMF’s  response  was 
strong, then the momentum behind regionalism was likely to 
be weak. If, on the other hand, significant shocks came from 
outside the region and the international response was inad-
equate, East Asian governments were more likely to set aside 
their differences and forge agreements on regional initiatives.
The present global financial crisis originated in the US 
financial system, and the weakness of East Asian economies 
stems in large part from the recessions in the United States and 
Europe. Korea has been the most affected as of this writing, as 
judged by currency depreciation, though others are likely to 
feel more negative effects. As mentioned above, in response, 
the US Federal Reserve has extended substantial swap agree-
ments to three key countries in the region, and the IMF has 
introduced two potentially useful facilities. The G-20 effort to 
restructure the global financial architecture sustains hope of 
rebalancing weights within international financial institutions 
toward East Asian governments. Whether these constructive 
international efforts are sufficient to address the concerns of 
the region’s governments remains to be seen, however. 
It is not clear that ASEAN+3 will agree to multilater-
alisation of the CMI at their meetings in winter and spring 
2009. Expansion of the BSAs and reliance on Fed swaps and 
IMF facilities remain viable alternatives. ASEAN+3 will prob-
ably leave a good deal of ambiguity about their plans in their 
announcements  after  the  meetings,  moreover.  Substantial 
ambiguity has been a characteristic of regional financial coop-
eration from the inception of the CMI. Ambiguity is in part 
a consequence of a common desire to project solidarity to the 
rest of the world while substantial differences remain among 
the members. But ASEAN+3 agreements are also ambiguous 
partly by design; it keeps options open and retains bargain-
ing leverage for a better deal in international institutions. As 
a consequence, the coming announcements are not likely to 
settle existing disagreements among outside observers over the 
likely path of East Asian financial cooperation.
ConClusions and reCoMMendaTions
A “multilaterisation” of the CMI could be a major contribution 
to the global financial architecture as well as regional cooperation 
in East Asia. It could supplement the resources of the IMF and 
streamline the process of negotiating parallel lines of defense in a 
financial rescue, among other benefits. But this harmonious result 
depends upon coordinating the construction of the regional fund 
with the existing international financial institutions, especially 
the IMF. While in principle one might imagine a regional insti-
tution that could mount financial rescues of East Asian states 
independently of the IMF, ASEAN+3 has not yet and probably 
In the absence of robust surveillance and 
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will not soon have the capacity to do so prudently. ASEAN+3’s 
surveillance mechanism is still in early stages of development 
and is not yet able to fashion appropriate policy conditions for 
balance-of-payments lending. Even the European Union, with 
considerably better developed analytical capacity, cooperated 
closely with the IMF on recent financial packages for Latvia and 
Hungary. East Asian governments must, therefore, continue to 
link the existing swap arrangements and link any common fund 
they might create to the IMF and its surveillance mechanism 
and analytical capacity—this is the first recommendation.
Second, ASEAN+3 should develop the regional surveil-
lance  mechanism  further.  Management  of  the  surveillance 
process  should  be  clearly  delegated  to  a  secretariat  with  a 
mandate to collect information, analyze it, present its conclu-
sions to the group, and lead peer-review sessions at deputies 
and ministerial meetings. It should draw upon and supplement, 
rather than duplicate, the surveillance mechanism of the IMF, 
in which these countries participate, by taking advantage of its 
geographical proximity and (presumably) greater acceptance of 
peer pressure from neighbors. Its conclusions should identify 
economic vulnerabilities in and desirable policy adjustments for 
the countries under review. This secretariat could also staff a 
new common fund but should strengthen regional surveillance 
irrespective of any decision on multilateralisation. 
Third, the United States and the rest of the world outside 
Asia cannot legitimately object as a matter of principle to the 
development of regional financial arrangements in ASEAN+3. 
The European Union operates its own balance-of-payments 
facility and has used it recently for members that have not yet 
adopted the euro. The United States has used the Treasury’s 
Exchange Stabilization Fund predominantly within the West-
ern Hemisphere and has recently greatly expanded the Federal 
Reserve’s swap agreements both in size and geographic scope. 
In developing the CMI and considering its regionalization, 
ASEAN+3 is following the path toward regional arrangements 
taken previously by other states and regions. If anything, East 
Asia’s  arrangements  have  been  more  tightly  and  explicitly 
linked to the IMF than the others (Henning 2002).
Fourth, however, non-Asians are right to raise questions 
about the relationship between East Asian arrangements and the 
IMF. The European Union’s Medium-Term Financial Assistance 
and the US Exchange Stabilization Fund carried less danger of 
conflict with multilateral arrangements than the regionaliza-
tion of the CMI because Europe and the United States domi-
nate the IMF and can thereby facilitate consistency between 
the IMF’s response to a crisis and their own. But East Asian 
governments carry considerably less weight in the IMF, and 
consistency between Asian arrangements and the Fund might 
be more difficult to forge in the heat of a crisis. Underrepre-
sentation of Asian countries, in other words, both gives rise to 
regional financial cooperation and complicates its coordination 
with the IMF. Officials within East Asia should not wait until 
they arrive at the threshold of a disbursement under the CMI 
before consulting with the IMF on technical details of activa-
tion and sequencing. At the same time, the full membership of 
the IMF should implement the 2008 reform package but also 
pursue more ambitious increases in quotas and redistribution of 
shares (see, for example, Truman (2006, 2008).  
Fifth, the recent creation of the SLF offers an opportunity 
for additional synergy between ASEAN+3 arrangements and the 
IMF. Designed to quickly provide short-term liquidity without 
the conditionality that the IMF applies to stand-by loans, the 
SLF could allow qualified countries to borrow up to five times 
their quota for a three-month period, renewable twice over any 
12-month period.18 ASEAN+3 could make qualification for the 
SLF sufficient to qualify for activation of the first 20 percent of 
CMI facilities, whether they remain bilateral swaps or are multi-
lateralised. For ASEAN+3, linking to the SLF in this way would 
draw on the surveillance analysis of the IMF in determining 
qualification. For the IMF, whose new facility has lacked formal 
applicants, such a link would make the SLF more attractive.
Sixth,  more  ambitiously,  the  international  community 
should  work  out  the  relationship  among  the  IMF,  regional 
financial facilities, and bilateral arrangements. Given the growth 
of international reserves, the rise of multiple pools of sover-
eign capital in various forms, and the increase in bilateral and 
regional financial agreements, the potential for disorganized or 
inconsistent responses to crises rises accordingly. Elsewhere, I 
have proposed the development of guidelines for the creation 
of regional and bilateral financial arrangements (Henning 2002 
and 2006). The members of the IMF should agree to a set of 
criteria that differentiate acceptable regional financial arrange-
ments from unacceptable ones and agree to submit all regional 
financial  arrangements  to  the  Executive  Board  for  review  at 
the time of their creation and periodically thereafter. Regional 
financial facilities, by these criteria, should (a) create no substan-
tial conflict with members’ obligations in the Fund, (b) be at 
least as transparent as Fund facilities and programs, (c) adopt 
conventional rules of emergency finance, and (d) apply sound 
conditionality  to  medium-term  balance-of-payments  lending 
in such a way as to not undercut Fund conditionality, among 
other things. Conditionality should be decided in light of the 
economic facts in each case rather than by competition among 
creditors. Establishing such guidelines should be a high priority 
in discussions about reforming the global financial architecture.
18. International Monetary Fund, “IMF Creates Short-term Liquidity Facility 
for Market-Access Countries,” Press Release No. 08/262, October 29, 2008, 
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I do not argue that it is necessary for all balance-of-payments 
financing to be channeled through the IMF.  Although we need 
strong  international  institutions,  especially  during  crises,  we 
must recognize that the Fund does not have a monopoly on 
economic wisdom and that regional lenders can play construc-
tive roles.  If regional groups or single governments wish to lend 
to countries confronting crises, the broader financial commu-
nity should not block such arrangements—provided they adhere 
to a set of common principles. 
The final set of recommendations addresses US and other 
non-Asian governments. US officials should be applauded for 
providing swap facilities to several East Asian central banks 
and for supporting new facilities at the IMF. But they should 
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